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Miele: Illegal Aliens and Workers' Compensation: The Aftermath of Sure-T

NOTE

ILLEGAL ALIENS AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION: THE AFTERMATH OF
SURE-TAN AND IRCA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,' the United States Supreme Court
finally settled the controversial issue of whether illegal aliens are entitled to protection under the National Labor Relations Act, and
held that they are so entitled.' In the decision, the Supreme Court
sustained the Board's finding that an employer commits an unfair
labor practice when he reports certain illegal aliens, who are among
his employees, to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.3
Before the Sure-Tan case reached the Supreme Court, the Administrative Law Judge,4 the Board, 5 and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit 6 had each found the employer to be in violation of
section 8(a)(3)7 of the NLRA. The Supreme Court similarly held
1. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
2. Id. at 892.

3. Id. at 897.
4. Id. at 888.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 889.
7. National Labor Relations Act §8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (stating that
"[i]t
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
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that the employer's actions violated the NLRA and ordered the
traditional Board remedies of backpay and reinstatement, provided
that the discriminatees could establish lawful presence in the United
States.8 Today, the results of the Sure-Tan decision are as controversial as the issue itself.
Although the Sure-Tan decision is relatively recent, other labor
cases have descended from that decision. 9 These cases include the
entitlement of illegal aliens to minimum wage, 10 overtime pay,' ahd
workers' compensation benefits.' 2 By holding that illegal aliens are
within the definition of "employee" under the NLRA, the Supreme
Court has profoundly affected the area of workers' compensation.
Today, every state in this nation, except one, allows illegal aliens to
collect workers' compensation benefits.'3
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that illegal aliens
should not be protected by the labor laws of this country, and thus
should not be entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The labor
protections granted to American citizens should not be extended to
illegal aliens for a number of reasons. This Note will establish that
the Sure-Tan decision, granting labor protection to illegal aliens, is
poorly reasoned.' 4 Additionally, this Note will explore the results of
Sure-Tan and illustrate how that decision, unsoundly decided as it
was, has effected the areas of workers' compensation,' 5 minimum
wage,' 6 and overtime pay.' 7 This Note will also examine the issue of
federal immigration policy, and it will demonstrate that even if the
membership in a labor organization.").
8.

467 U.S. at 906.

9. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S.
Ct. 1120 (1989); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986); Local
512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986); WJA
Realty Ltd. v. Nelson, 708 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Breakfast Prods. Inc., 293
N.L.R.B. 70 (1989).

10. Patel, 846 F.2d at 700 (stating that the overtime and minimum wage provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act are applicable to illegal aliens).
11. Id.
12. See North, Labor Market Rights of Foreign-born Workers, 105

MONTHLY

LAD,

REV. 32 (1981) (discussing that illegal aliens are protected by the workers' compensation statutes enacted in every state but Vermont).
13. Id. at 33.

14. See infra text accompanying notes 55-106 (analyzing in detail the faulty rationale
behind the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 107-32 (analyzing in detail the application of the
Sure-Tan decision to extend workers' compensation benefits to illegal aliens).

16. See infra text accompanying notes 133-57 (analyzing in detail the extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage and overtime provisions to undocumented aliens
based on the Sure-Tan decision).

17. Id.
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Sure-Tan decision rested on a more solid footing, the federal government's concern with halting illegal immigration into this country,",
along with other factors involved in federal immigration policy, 19 requires a different conclusion. In fact, this note will propose that the
congressional enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act20 represents a legislative decree that the Sure-Tan decision
2
should be overruled1.
Finally, this Note will discuss why the various
constitutional arguments offered in support of illegal aliens' rights to
workers' compensation benefits must fail. 2
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN

A.

Sure-Tan

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB

In 1984, the Supreme Court held that illegal aliens are entitled
to protection under the NLRA.2 3 In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the
Court, agreeing with the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB"), held that illegal aliens are "employees" within the
meaning of section 2(3) of the Act,2 4 and are thus entitled to all the
18. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982)) (stating that immigration quota restrictions
have been imposed to protect U.S. job markets).
19. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986), amending the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter
IRCA]. The employer sanction provisions of IRCA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (Supp. IV 1986),
establish penalties against employers who hire "unauthorized aliens" after November 6, 1986.
IRCA was enacted after the Sure-Tan decision and is commonly known as the SimpsonRodino Act.
20. Id.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 168-75 (discussing in detail that the enactment of
IRCA would now prohibit the Sure-Tan decision).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 176-225 (analyzing in detail that the application
of such constitutional guarantees as the Equal Protection Clause or the doctrine of federal preemption would not require granting illegal aliens protection under workers' compensation
statutes).
23. 467 U.S. at 883.
24. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)(1982). Section 2(3)
states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this Act explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to
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rights and privileges afforded by it.2 5
In Sure-Tan, the petitioner, two small leather processing companies, which for the purposes of the NLRA constituted a single integrated employer, was found guilty of an unfair labor practice by
reporting a number of its employees, who were illegal aliens, to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter "INS"). 26
These employees later accepted voluntary departure from the U.S.,
rather than face formal deportation proceedings. 17
The petitioner's actions followed from the successful union organization drive by the Chicago Leather Workers Union in organizing its employees.2 8 In 1976, the union had prevailed in a Board election, against the wishes of the petitioner, and became the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of Sure-Tan, Inc.'s employees. 29
Following the election, petitioner filed objections to the election with
the Board, arguing that a majority of the eligible voters were illegal
aliens.30 However, the Board overruled the objections and stated that
the union would be certified, regardless of whether the voting employees were illegal aliens.31 The petitioner then sent a letter to the
INS, requesting that the agency investigate the legal status of a
number of its employees.3 2 Agents of the INS did make the requested inquiry, and discovered that five of the petitioner's employees "were living and working illegally in the United States. ' 3 All
five employees accepted a grant of voluntary departure as a substitute for deportation. 4
The Board later issued complaints alleging that the petitioner
had committed unfair labor practices.3 5 The Board affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that the petitioner violated sections
8(a)(1) a" and (3)37 by prompting the INS investigation "solely betime, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
Id.
25. 467 U.S. at 892. The Supreme Court states that "since undocumented aliens are not
among the few groups of workers expressly exempted by Congress, they plainly come within
the broad statutory definition of 'employee.'" Id.

26. Id. at 887.
27.

Id.

28. Id. at 888.
29. Id. at 886.
30. Id. at 887.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35.
36.

Id.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.

§

158(a)(1) (1982). The text of

section 8(a)(1) reads in relevant part, that "[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
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cause the employees supported the Union." ' The Board agreed with
the Administrative Law Judge that "the discriminatees' subsequent
deportation was the proximate result of the discriminatorily motivated action by [petitioner] and constitutes a constructive discharge."3 9 The Board then ordered the petitioner to comply with its
traditional remedies for unfair labor practice violations, reinstatement and backpay.40
The court of appeals agreed with the Board, holding that the
petitioner had violated the NLRA by constructively discharging the
undocumented alien employees. 4 ' The court of appeals then ordered
42
the petitioner to comply with the Board's remedy provisions.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Board's
finding that an unfair labor practice had been committed.4 3 The
Court held that illegal aliens are protected from the unfair labor
practices of their employers. 44 It reasoned that "[t] he Board has consistently held that undocumented aliens are 'employees' within the
meaning of section 2(3) of the Act."145 In the Sure-Tan decision, the
Court stated that the Board's construction of the term "employee" is
entitled to "considerable deference. 46 The deference afforded the
NLRB stems from the fact that it is the NLRB's task, as an agency
created by Congress to administer the NLRA, to define that term.47
The Supreme Court, relying on the Board's interpretation, found
that since illegal aliens are not among the list of specified exemptions
under section 2(3) of the Act they come within "the broad statutory
definition of 'employee.' "48 The Court accepted the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) as being inclusive of undocumented aliens
because, at the time of the opinion in Sure-Tan, no provision of the
INA49 made the employment of illegal aliens unlawful.5 0 Thus, the
ployer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed

in section 7." Id.
37.

National Labor Relations Act

§

8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.

§

158(a)(1) (1982).

38. 467 U.S. at 888.
39. Id.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 889.

42. Id. at 889-90.
43. Id. at 894.
44. Id. at 892.
45.

Id. at 891.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 892.
49. See IRCA, supra note 19.
50. 467 U.S. at 892-93. The Supreme Court states that "Congress has not adopted provisions in the INA making it unlawful for an employer to hire an alien who is present or
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Supreme Court held that by including illegal aliens within the definition of employee under the NLRA, the Board's interpretation was
fully consistent with the INA and federal immigration policy. 51
Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented from the majority opinion. 52 Their dissent suggests that it is very unlikely that Congress
intended the term "employee" to embrace, for purposes of NLRA
protection, persons unlawfully present in the United States.53 The
dissent suggests that illegal aliens are not entitled to protection
under the NLRA because they are "persons wanted by the United
States for the violation of our criminal laws." '54
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, in their dissent, seem to have a
better understanding of the serious and complex ramifications of the
majority's holding in Sure-Tan. The majority's opinion is a much
weaker argument in light of its poor reasoning.
B.

Case Criticism

The majority opinion in Sure-Tan is open to very serious criticism because of the amount of deference afforded to the NLRB's
interpretation of section 2(3). Federal labor and immigration policies, coupled with the lack of a valid rationale behind the Board's
decision to include illegal aliens within the definition of "employee"
under the Act, illustrate that the deference given to the Board has
achieved the wrong result in granting the labor protections of the
NLRA and workers' compensation statutes to illegal aliens.
The Supreme Court, in adtopting the NLRB's interpretation of
the term "employee" as being inclusive of illegal aliens, gives too
much deference to the Board's finding that section 2(3) extends coverage of the NLRA to undocumented aliens. The Supreme Court
stated that its decision was based on the fact the Board has consistently found that "undocumented aliens are 'employees' within the
meaning of ...

the Act."55

Early in the history of federal labor policy, the deference afforded to the NLRB's findings of fact was based on the theory that
the Board is an agency "created by Congress to carry out a policy
working in the United States without appropriate authorization." Id.
51. Id. at 892. The Court holds "[c]ounterintuitive though it may be, we do not find any
conflict between application of the NLRA to undocumented aliens and the mandate of the
Immigration and Nationality Act." Id.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 913.
Id.
Id.
467 U.S. at 891.
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expressed in broad statutory terms."' 6 That deference is based partly
on the fact that the administrative law judge is in a position to ob-

serve the witnesses on a first hand basis." Also, the amount of deference given by reviewing courts is due to the fact that the Board is

"one of those agencies with a specialized field of knowledge, whose
findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which

courts do not possess and therefore must respect."" 8 As a result of
this practice of affording special deference to Board findings, reviewing courts must adhere to a strict standard of ensuring that there is
substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Board's
in section 10(f)60 of
findings.5 9 This standard of review, incorporated 61
the NLRA, however "eludes precise definition."
The principles guiding reviewing courts are clearly general and
overbroad; thus, judges have broad discretion in deciding the amount
of deference to afford Board findings. As a result, the "[a]pplication
of this deferential standard ... has not been consistent. The accept-

ance given decisions of the NLRB by the Supreme Court has hardly
been steadfast, and the passage of time has not revealed a trend to-

ward one preferred position."

2

In exercising their discretion, review-

ing courts will look to many factors in deciding the amount of defer-

ence to grant a Board finding.63 A more restrictive approach to
judicial review has thus emerged. Under this theory the Board's findings are entitled to "some" deference. 4 But as the Court has held,
"this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear
56. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968). The Supreme Court
held that "[tihe respect required in a given case may be determinative of the outcome, for if
great weight is given to an agency's interpretation, it must be given effect even if the court
would have decided otherwise in the first instance." Id.; see also A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, LABOR LAW, at 108 (10th ed. 1986) [hereinafter LABOR LAW].

57. See

LABOR LAW,

supra note 56, at 108.

58. Id.; see also United Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
59. See LABOR LAW, supra note 56. The authors state, "[i]n reviewing an order issued
by the NLRB, courts must accept the Board's findings of fact if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole." Id. at 108.
60. See National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1982). The relevant
part of 10(f) provides that "the finding of the Board-with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall in like manner be
conclusive." Id.
61. See LABOR LAW, supra note 56. The authors state that "this general standard of
review eludes a precise definition." Id.
62. Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 203 (Oct. 21 1981).
63. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at
251-57 (7th ed. 1979) (stating that in determining what degree of deference is appropriate, an
appraisal of several factors should be made, including whether the issue involved is factual or
legal).
64. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1979).
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meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and
history."6 5
Using this new approach, and considering the various factors
involved in the Sure-Tan decision, it is apparent that the Supreme
Court should not have deferred its interpretation of the term "employee" to the NLRB. Instead, the Supreme Court should have reviewed the record to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that illegal aliens are entitled to
protection under the NLRA.66 Under the new restrictive approach to
judicial review, 7 the Court should have also inquired into the policies and purposes underlying the NLRA, while being mindful of federal immigration policy.6 8
In reviewing the record, the Supreme Court in Sure-Tan should
have realized that the NLRB has continually neglected to put forth
any sufficient rationale to justify its interpretation of the Act so as to
include illegal aliens.6 9 The Court in Sure-Tan deferred the interpretation of section 2(3) to the Board because, according to the Court,
the Board has had a long history of consistently holding that illegal
aliens are to be included in the definition of "employee. ' 70 In fact,
however, this practice has not had a long history, but dates back
only to 1973. ' In holding that illegal aliens are employees under the
NLRA, the Board merely cites to earlier decisions that stand either
for the same proposition, 72 or for the rule that non-citizenship is not
65.

Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979). The Supreme

Court states that "[ailthough an agency's interpretation of the statute under which it operates

is entitled to some deference," this deference is limited to a reasonable interpretation of
the
statute. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 411.

66. See National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1982).
67.

442 U.S. at 411-12.

68. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942) (stating that according to
the "accommodation" doctrine, the NLRB is required to take into account other federal statutes when administering the NLRA).

69. See Comment, Illegal Aliens as "Employees" Under the National Labor Relations

Act: NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 68 GEO. L.J. 851, 857 (1980) (authored by Violette Witwer
Fernandez); Comment, Illegal Aliens Are Employees Under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) and
May Vote in Union Certification Elections: NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 10 RuT.-CAM. LJ.747,
751 (1979) (authored by Lewis A. Scheindlin); see also Casenotes, Rights Without a Remedy-Illegal Aliens Under The National Labor Relations Act: Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak
Leather Company v. NLRB, 27 B.C.L. REV. 407 (1986) (authored by John W. Sagaser) [here-

inafter Casenotes] (discussing the application of the NLRA to illegal aliens).

70. 467 U.S. at 891.
71. See Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973). The NLRB held that a

challenge to a union's majority status, based on the fact that those holding authorization cards
were aliens, must fail. Id.
72. See, e.g., Sun Country Citrus, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 700 (1984) (stating that illegal
aliens possess section 7 rights and may not be discriminatorily treated for the exercise of those
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a basis for exclusion from a bargaining unit 73 or disqualification
from voting in elections conducted by the Board.7 4 As a result, a
clear Board policy has developed in which it has refused to discriminate based on the legal status of alien employees.7 5 However, this

policy of non-discrimination is not applicable to illegal aliens, who
enter and remain in this country in knowing violation of federal

law,76 and whose unlawful status results from-an intentional discrimination by an affirmative congressional decision.77 Furthermore, in
rights without violating section 8(a)(1)); La Mousse, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 37 (1981) (holding
that an employee's status as an illegal alien is irrelevant in a discriminatory discharge case);
Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1978) (finding that an empl6yee's illegal alien status is
irrelevant in a discriminatory discharge case); Hasa Chem., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 903 (1978)
(stating that the NLRA protects illegal alien employees who are interrogated and coerced by
their employer in violation of section 8(a)(1)); Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978)
(holding that an employee's illegal alien status is not relevant in a discriminatory discharge
case); John Dory Boat Works, 229 N.L.R.B. 844 (1977) (stating that the NLRA extends
protections to illegal alien employees who are interrogated and coerced by their employer in
violation of section 8(a)(1)); Sure-Tan, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 138 (1977) (finding that the alien
status of employees in bargaining unit is no bar to Board certification of union); Amay's
Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976) (holding that NLRA protects illegal alien
employees from discriminatory discharges in violation of section 8(a)(3)); Handling Equip.
Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 64, 65 (1974) (finding that illegal aliens "lacking working papers" are
employees covered under the Act); Lawrence Rigging Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973) (holding that an alien employee, legally in the country on a visa, but without a green card, was
eligible to vote as an "employee" in a Board election).
73. See, e.g., Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1095 (1973) (holding that
the eligibility of aliens to vote in Board certification elections was to be "well established");
Seidmon, Seidmon, Henkin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B. 1492, 1493 (1953) (holding that the
eligibility of aliens to vote in Board certification elections was "well established"); In re Cities
Serv. Oil Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 324, 331 (1949) (rejecting an employer's objections to election); In
re Azusa Citrus Ass'n, 65 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1138 (1946) (rejecting a petition to exclude Mexican nationals from bargaining unit); In re Allen & Sandiland Packing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 724,
730 (1944) (rejecting a petition to exclude Mexican nationals from a bargaining unit); In re
Dan Logan & J.R. Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B. 310, 315 (1944) (holding that noncitizenship does not
disqualify employees from voting in elections because the Act does not distinguish citizens
from noncitizens, and that by not making such a distinction, it effectuates the purpose of the
Act).
74. See supra note 73 (discussing illegal aliens' eligibility to vote in Board elections,
despite their illegal status).
75. See Sun Country Citrus, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 700 (1984); La Mousse, Inc., 259
N.L.R.B. 37 (1981); Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1978); Hasa Chem., Inc., 235
N.L.R.B. 903 (1978); Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978); John Dory Boat Works, 229
N.L.R.B. 844 (1977); Sure-Tan, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 138 (1977); Amay's Bakery & Noodle
Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976); Handling Equip. Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 64 (1974); Lawrence
Rigging Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973).
76. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982)); see also Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1986), amending Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1976) (specifying qualifications of each class of immigrant
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Plyler v. Doe, 8 the Court recognized the legitimacy of excluding illegal aliens from the same privileges that those who are lawfully present in the United States are entitled to, stating that illegal alienage
is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause, because their presence in this country, in violation of federal law, is not
79
a "constitutional irrelevancy.
The Supreme Court in Sure-Tan relied on the Board's interpretation of the term "employee" and then attempted to support its decision with a statement that the holding was consistent with both the
policies and purposes underlying the NLRA and federal immigration
policy, as contained in the INA."0 However, not only does that interpretation of "employee," as defined by the Board and adopted in
Sure-Tan, lack any sufficient rationale, it also directly conflicts with
the federal government's labor and immigration policies. 8'
In holding that illegal aliens are "employees" within the meaning of the Act, the Supreme Court believed that it would further the
policies of the NLRA by encouraging and protecting the collective
bargaining process. 82 However, a review of the purposes and policies
of the statute demonstrates that Sure-Tan simply fails to do so.
Unlike those who are specifically excluded from section 2(3)'s
definition of "employee," illegal aliens are not mentioned in the
Act. 83 The legislative history of the NLRA offers no indication that
Congress ever considered the Act as being applicable to illegal
aliens.8 4 As stated by Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the NLRA,
alien allowed to enter the United States and outlining conditions under which each class may

enter).
78. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
79. Id. at 223.
80. 467 U.S. at 892-93.
81. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982)

(stating that "[i]t is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers. .. ").

82. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). Section I of the Act provides in relevant part:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or

interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,

hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.
Id.; see also 467 U.S. at 892. The Supreme Court states that "extending the coverage of the
Act to such workers is consistent with the Act's avowed purpose of encouraging and protecting
the collective-bargaining process." Id.
83. See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).

84. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1935) (finding the definition of
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the policies behind the Act were designed to equalize the balance of

economic power between American workers and their employers.8 5

The Act sought to foster the collective bargaining process while at

the same time attempted to lift the American nation out of the Depression by stimullating the demand for goods. s6 Therefore, it seems
doubtful that Senator Wagner, in sponsoring the bill, 7 and Congress, in enacting the NLRA, 8B ever intended to place persons unlawfully present in this country under the Act's protection.
Furthermore, in the debates preceding the enactment of both
the NLRA and the Labor Management Relations Act8 9 there were

frequent references to "American workingmen.""0 These references
should be interpreted as requiring that workers be American citizens
in order to enjoy the protections of the Act. These references to the
"American workingmen" represent an explicit recognition of the
Act's applicability. Thus, the congressional history of the Act clearly
indicates a desire to exclude illegal aliens. In fact, before reaching
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in

Sure-Tan correctly commented that the references to "American
workingmen" in the NLRA's legislative history may mean that only
American residents are entitled to the protections under the Act.9"
The deference afforded the Board's interpretation in Sure-Tan
should also be viewed as unsound because that decision is inconsistent with federal immigration policy."2 At the time of the Sure-Tan
decision, the Supreme Court held that its decision was in accord
"employee" under the Act to be self-explanatory); H.R. REP. No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
9-10 (1935) (containing no discussion of the statutory definition of "employee" covered by the
Act); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935) (containing no discussion of the
statutory definition of "employee" to be covered by the Act); 79 CONG. REC. H9722-31 (1935)
(containing the House debate and passage of the Act with no discussion of the NLRA's "employee" definition); id. at 9720-21 (containing a proposed amendment to include agricultural
workers within the definition of "employee," which was rejected).
85. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)) (discussing the avowed purposes behind the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act).
86. Id.
87. See 93 CONG. REC. 3323 (1947), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SEN.
COMMN.
ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., (1947) and in LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF LABOR MANAGEMENT
ATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR].

RELATIONS

AcT OF 1947, at 998-99 (1947) [hereinafter

SEN-

88. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
89. Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)).
90. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, supra note 87.
91. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 359 n.6 (7th Cir. 1978).
92. See IRCA, supra note 19 (discussing penalties against employers who hire unauthorized aliens).
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with federal immigration policy because the INA did not make it
unlawful for an employer to hire illegal aliens.93 However, in 1986,
Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 4 which
prohibits the employment of undocumented aliens.95 As a result, the
Sure-Tan decision is in direct conflict with current U.S. immigration
policy. The Supreme Court has itself stated that the employment of
undocumented aliens in periods of high unemployment deprives citizens of jobs."" In fact, several states have enacted statutes to prevent
the employment of illegal aliens for this very reason.97 The Supreme
Court is incorrect in stating that the Sure-Tan decision is consistent
with federal immigration policy. The Court's assertion simply does
not square with the fact that a primary purpose of the INA is to
preserve jobs for American workers.9 8 Undocumented alien workers
reduce the employment opportunities available to American workers. 9 As a result, members of the executive and legislative branches
argue that the influx of unlawful entrants is an immediate national
problem. 100 Furthermore, the presence of illegal alien employees has
serious impact on those American workers who remain gainfully employed by seriously depressing wage scales and working conditions
while also diminishing the effectiveness of labor unions. 01 Therefore,
the Supreme Court in its Sure-Tan decision ignores federal immigration policy by granting labor protection to illegal aliens, while the
93. See 467 U.S. at 892 (stating that the Supreme Court "[did] not find any conflict
between application of the NLRA to undocumented aliens and the mandate of the Immigra-

tion and Nationality Act.").
94.

See IRCA, supra note 19.

95. Id.
96.

467 U.S. at 893.

97. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of
a California labor statute prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4409 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
149, § 19c (West 1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-11.1 (1986). The Connecticut provision,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51k (West Supp. 1981), was declared unconstitutional because
of its overbreadth in Nozewski Polish Style Meat Prods. v. Meskill, 376 F. Supp. 610 (D.
Conn. 1974).
98. 467 U.S. at 893 (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982)).
99. Id. at 892-93.
100. See, e.g., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

97th Cong., 1st Sess. 223

(1981). [hereinafter HEARINGS]. Proponents of immigration reform justify sweeping changes
based on the proposition that the influx of illegal aliens is a national problem and argue their
position with two assertions. See id. First, the number of illegal aliens entering this country
will continue to grow unless action is taken to limit their entry. See id. Second, many illegal
aliens who are apprehended in the U.S. are working in jobs that pay well and are attractive to
those legally present in the United States. See id.
101. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-57.
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INA would afford no such statutory protection.
Finally, the deference afforded the Board's interpretation of the
term "employee" should be viewed as unwisely granted because the
results of Sure-Tan conflict with a recently enacted piece of federal
immigration legislation. 102 In 1986, congressional enactment of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act prohibited the employment of
any illegal alien.103 This law, which is in direct opposition to the
Sure-Tan decision, must prevail. It is a well-established principle
that the Board must abide by certain rules of construction and interpretation. According to Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB 104 and the
"accommodation" doctrine, 10 the Board must address other federal
statutes, including immigration policy, when administering the
NLRA. 10 1 The NLRB's interpretations and construction of the Act
must be fully consistent with other federal statutes and their underlying policies. Therefore, because the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) ignores federal immigration policy and since it is now illegal for undocumented aliens to work in the United States, the
deference afforded to the NLRB's interpretation of "employee"
should be viewed as ill-conceived.
Application of the NLRA to illegal aliens is the result of
stretching and extrapolating the purposes of the Act. However, when
combined with the fact that there is no valid basis for the Board's
interpretation of section 2(3) as being inclusive of illegal aliens, the
legislative history and policies of the NLRA along with federal immigration laws require a different result than the one in Sure-Tan.
III.

RESULTS OF THE

A.

Sure-Tan DECISION

Workers' Compensation

The Supreme Court's Sure-Tan decision is now cited in a long
line of cases that stand for the proposition that illegal aliens are employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA.' 0 However, Sure-Tan has also been used to extend labor protection to illegal aliens beyond the realm of the NLRA and the federal
102. See IRCA, supra note 19.
103. Id.
104. 316 US. 31 (1942).
105. Id. at 47.
106. Id.
107. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S.
Ct. 1120 (1989); Bevles Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986); Local
512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986); WJA
Realty Ltd. v. Nelson, 708 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Breakfast Prods. Inc., 293
N.L.R.B. 70 (1989).
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government. 08 One such area, dramatically affected by the SureTan decision, is workers' compensation. 109
Workers' compensation benefits are a form of labor protection
granted to employees who are injured during the course of their employment."10 Unlike the NLRA, workers' compensation is not a form
of protection afforded by the federal government."' Instead, workers' compensation benefits are granted by the various states, each
with its own requirements for entitlement." 2 Although there are variations among the different state statutes, some of the more common
elements necessary to collect these benefits include the existence of a
contract of employment, either express or implied,"13 and an injury
sustained while in the actual performance of services for an employer." 4 In the overwhelming majority of states, the right of an injured employee to workers' compensation is not conditioned on his
citizenship or legal status in this country.' 15
Although the states are free to enact their own legislation dealing with workers' compensation benefits, the Sure-Tan decision has
been an influential factor in favor of extending such labor rights to
illegal aliens." 6 Today, in every state but Vermont, '1 employers are
required by state legislation to provide workers' compensation protection for injured workers, legal and illegal residents alike." 8 Like
the Court in Sure-Tan, many state courts have relied indirectly on
the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) to hold that illegal aliens
are protected by state labor statutes. 19 The language of these statutes is based, either entirely or in part, upon the language of section
2(3) in defining those "employees" covered by these state labor statutes. 12 0 Consequently, the NLRB's interpretation of the term "em108. See Patel, 660 F. Supp. at 1528; Cenvill Dev. Corp., 478 So. 2d at 1168; Gene's
Harvesting, 421 So. 2d at 701.
109. See North, supra note 12.
110. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 151 (1976).
III. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 152 (1976).
112. Id.
113. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 153 (1976).
114. Id.
115. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 155 (1976).
116. See Cenvill Dev. Corp., 478 So. 2d at 1168; Gene's Harvesting,421 So. 2d at 701.
117. See North, supra note 12.
118. Id. at 33.
119. See, e.g., Cenvill Dev. Corp., 478 So. 2d at 1168; Gene's Harvesting,421 So. 2d at
701.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1 1)(a) (Supp. 1980). The Florida workers' compensation
statute follows the form of section 2(3) of the NLRA in defining "employees" entitled to
protection under the statute by listing a few explicit exceptions to the statute's coverage. See

id.
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ployee" carries great weight in these states.' 2 ' Thus, in granting
workers' compensation benefits to illegal aliens, various jurisdictions
22
have relied, either entirely or in part, on the Sure-Tan decision.' 12 3
A recent Florida case, Cenvill Development Corp. v. Candelo,
although decided before the opinion in Sure-Tan, mirrors the Supreme Court's reasoning, and thus suffers from the same weaknesses
as the Supreme Court's decision. In Cenvill Development Corp., the
District Court of Appeal for the First District reversed a lower court
decision which had held that undocumented aliens are not entitled to
workers' compensation benefits due to their unlawful presence in this
country.124 The District Court of Appeal, however, using a line of
reasoning identical to that of the Supreme Court's in Sure-Tan, held
that illegal aliens are entitled to protection under Florida's workers'
compensation statute.' 2 5 The District Court of Appeal reasoned that
illegal aliens are "employees" as defined by the state's workers' compensation statute. 26 The language of the Florida statute, by listing
those who are and who are not covered by the state legislation,
27
mimics that of section 2(3) of the NLRA in defining "employee.'
Like the Supreme Court in Sure-Tan, the Florida court relied on
other cas*es which held that nothing in the state's workers' compensation statute suggests that illegal alien workers should be excluded
from coverage. 2 ' Also, these courts found that since illegal aliens
are not included in the list of those specifically exempted from the
statute's protection, that there was no evidence of an intent to exclude illegal aliens. 29
Such reasoning, like that of Sure-Tan, suffers from the same
lack of a valid rationale for extending coverage to illegal aliens, in
light of the purposes and policies of these labor statutes. Also, the
line of reasoning employed in Cenvill Development Corp. is in direct
conflict with current federal immigration policy. The court in Cenvill
Development Corp., deciding the case prior to the enactment of
IRCA, held that its decision was consistent with federal immigration
policy because nothing within that policy prevented the lawful em121.

See, e.g.. Cenvill Dev. Corp., 478 So. 2d at 1168; Gene's Harvesting,421 So. 2d at

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
478 So. 2d at 1168.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 440.02(11)(a) (Supp. 1980).
478 So. 2d at 1170.
Id.

701.
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ployment of illegal aliens.""0 However, with the enactment of IRCA,
it is currently illegal for an employer to hire undocumented aliens.131
As a result, Cenvill Development Corp., like Sure-Tan, should yield
to this prohibition contained in the recent amendment to the INA, 1 32
when taken in view of its inconsistencies with federal policy, and the
accomodation doctrine. Thus, the latest changes to federal immigration policy should compel the withdrawal of the labor protections
granted by state legislation to illegal aliens.
B.

The Fair Labor Standards Act 1 33

Like workers' compensation benefits, the protection of the Fair
Labor Standards Act has also been extended to illegal aliens.1 34
Comparable to workers' compensation protection, the Fair Labor
Standards Act's application is a direct result of the Sure-Tan decision.' 35 The Fair Labor Standards Act is the primary piece of federal labor legislation setting forth minimum labor standards for
working conditions in the United States. 3 6 The Act is designed to
eliminate "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.' 3 7 To address these concerns, the statute
provides for a minimum wage and for a specified overtime rate to be
paid to employees within its scope.'38
Like the definition of "employee" found within section 2(3) of
the NLRA, the definition of "employee" under the Fair Labor Standards Act is also overbroad and general. 39 It too lists a set of specified exemptions to the Act's definition of "employee,' 140 rather than
specifically enumerating those covered by it. Similar to the way
workers' compensation benefits have been extended to illegal aliens
130.

Id.

131.

See IRCA, supra note 19.

132. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-217 (1988).
134. See, e.g., Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd sub
nom., Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1120

(1989) (stating that the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act are applicable to undocumented aliens).
135. Id.
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
137. Id.
138. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a), 215(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), (g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
140. H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d CONG., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3201, 3204.
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through the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan, the protection of
the Fair Labor Standards Act has also been granted to illegal aliens
14 1
based on that holding.
An example of that extension is Patel v. Quality Inn South. 42
In Patel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the definitional framework of the Fair Labor Standards Act, consisting of a broad general definition followed by several specific exceptions, strongly suggested that Congress intended
an all-encompassing definition of the term "employee" that would
include all workers not specifically excepted. 143 The U.S. Court of
Appeals reasoned that such a definition necessarily included illegal
aliens. 4

In Patel, an undocumented alien brought suit to recover unpaid
overtime pay, alleging that his employer violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 145 At trial, the United States
District Court granted the employer's motion to dismiss, reasoning
that illegal aliens were not within the definition of "employee" under
the Act. 46 Thus, the court reasoned, illegal aliens had no right to
complain of any violations of the Act. 47 The district court's decision
carefully evaluated both the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan,
and the recently enacted amendment to the INA, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act. 48 As a result of this analysis, the district
court stated that IRCA mandated a different conclusion than the
one in Sure-Tan. 4 The district court held that IRCA required the
federal government to hold inapplicable the protections of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to illegal aliens because the INA now prohibits
the lawful employment of illegal aliens. 50 The district court stated,
"[f]or this court to interpret the protection of the FLSA to apply to
illegal aliens would so obviously conflict with the purpose and policy
behind the IRCA so as to fly in the face of what Congress has attempted to do.''5 The district court then rejected the Supreme
141. See, e.g., Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd sub
nom., Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (1lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1120

(1989).
142.
143.

Id.
Id at 702.

144. Id. at 702-3.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Patel, 660 F. Supp. at 1528.
Id. at 1536.
Id. at 1535.
Id. at 1534-35.
Id. at 1534.
Id. at 1531.
Id.
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Court's line of reasoning in Sure-Tan as "counterintuitive' '5 r2 to the
policies behind the INA, which now evince "a foremost concern with
'
the employment of illegal aliens." 153
In reversing the district court's decision, 54 the U.S. Court of
Appeals rejected the exhaustive analysis which the lower court used
to determine that federal labor protection should not be extended to
illegal aliens. 55 Instead, the court of appeals simply forced its holding to mimic that of the Supreme Court's in Sure-Tan.'58 The court
of appeals stated, "the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan weighs
heavily in favor of Patel's contention that Congress did not' ' intend to
exclude undocumented aliens from the FLSA's coverage. 5
By ignoring the deliberate findings of the lower court, and
merely making its holding concur with that of the Supreme Court in
Sure-Tan, the U.S. Court of Appeals perpetuates what should obviously be viewed as an unwise line of reasoning. The grant of protection under the FLSA, like the protections granted by various state
workers' compensation laws, adopts Sure-Tan's extension of labor
rights without the benefit of any sound rationale, while also conflicting directly with federal labor and immigration policies. The invalidation of Sure-Tan should thus be seen as inevitable.
IV. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POLICY

A.

INA Policy Prior to IRCA

The protections afforded to illegal aliens under cases like SureTan, notwithstanding the absence of any proper rationale for extending such coverage, 58 may have once been in accord with federal
immigration policies established by the INA prior to 1986. Before
the enactment of IRCA, a primary purpose of the INA was to restrict immigration in order to preserve jobs for American workers." 9
Thus the Supreme Court believed that by extending labor protection to illegal aliens, their coverage under the NLRA would be
consistent with the policies and purposes underlying the INA.6 0 The
152. Id. at 1533.
153. Id.
154. Patel, 846 F.2d at 701.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 55-106 (discussing in detail the defects in the
Sure-Tan decision extending labor protection to illegal aliens).
159. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982).
160. 467 U.S. at 892. The Supreme Court states that "extending the coverage of the
Act to such workers is consistent with the Act's avowed purpose of encouraging and protecting
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Court in Sure-Tan was concerned that if undocumented aliens were
not protected by the NLRA, they would be exploited by having to
accept low wages and poor working conditions which would compete
with those of unionized U.S. workers.161 Enforcement of the NLRA
on behalf of undocumented alien workers, the Court reasoned, would
help to assure that the competition of undocumented alien employees
would not adversely affect the wages and employment conditions of
lawful residents.'6 2
As additional support for its holding .that undocumented aliens
are covered by the NLRA, the Court found that the INA is principally concerned with the terms of admission to the United States,
and not with employment. 63 The Court observed that Congress did
not make it unlawful for an employer to hire undocumented aliens,
nor did it create a separate criminal offense for an alien to accept
employment without authorization. 6 Therefore, the Court found
workers under the NLRA would not
that coverage of undocumented
65
conflict with the INA.1
Thus, the Sure-Tan decision may have at one time presented no
conflict with federal immigration policy. However, that policy has
since been changed.166 Under current immigration laws, the employment of illegal aliens is prohibited. 61 The Board's interpretation of
section 2(3), as being inclusive of illegal aliens, must acquiesce to
this new policy. As a result, federal, as well as state labor protections
such as workers' compensation benefits, must not be extended to illegal aliens.
the collective-bargaining process." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 893. The Supreme Court states that "[a]pplication of the NLRA helps to
assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected
by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of

employment." Id.
163.

Id. at 892 (holding that "[tihis Court has observed that '[t]he central concern of

the INA is with the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent
treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.' ") Id.

164. Id. at 893. The Court based its holding on the fact that "Congress has not made it
a separate criminal offense for an alien to accept employment after entering this country illegally." Id.
165. Id. The Court held that "[s]ince the employment relationship between an employer
and an undocumented alien is hence not illegal under the INA, there is no reason to conclude

that application to the NLRA to employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily
conflict with the terms of the INA." Id.

166. See IRCA, supra note 19.
167.

Id.
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B. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
In response to the concerns that unemployment will continue to
rise if illegal immigration is left unrestrained, 68 Congress recently
emphasized the need to control illegal immigration by eliminating
the availability of employment opportunities for illegal aliens within
the United States. 6 9 Senator Alan K. Simpson, the most outspoken
proponent of immigration reform in Congress, successfully guided
the IRCA through the Senate in 1985.10 This amendment to the
INA makes it unlawful for an employer to hire "unauthorized
aliens" knowingly or in violation of specified procedures, and establishes sanctions against employers who violate the Act's provisions.'
As a result of IRCA's enactment, it should be seen that SureTan is no longer a proper basis upon which to extend labor protection to the millions of illegal aliens present in this country. As the
majority itself stated in Sure-Tan, the extension of labor protection
to illegal aliens was consistent with the INA because at the time of
the Court's decision no provision of the INA made it unlawful for an
employer to hire illegal aliens.' 72 However, with the enactment of
IRCA, this is no longer true. To hold that federal or state labor
protection should be granted to illegal aliens after the enactment of
IRCA would obstruct the intentions of Congress in drafting and enacting that piece of legislation. Allowing illegal aliens to benefit from
the labor statutes enacted within this nation, at both the federal and
state levels, would clearly run counter to the legislative desire to halt
the influx of illegal immigrants into this country, by making employment within U.S. borders far more attractive than employment in
their respective countries. 7
168.

See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S7039 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simpson, introducing

the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985, stating that "countless studies have...
shown that illegal immigration depresses the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.").
169. See IRCA, supra note 19. The House bill, entitled the Immigration Reform Act of
1985, passed by a vote of 238 to 173. Pear, House Approves Compromise Bill on Illegal

Aliens, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1986, at BI5, col. 4. Lawmakers described it as a historic step in

halting the influx of illegal aliens into the United States. Id. The Senate passed the revolutionary bill by a vote of 63 to 24. Pasztor, Immigration Bill Passes Congress as Session Ends,

Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 2, col. 4.
170. See 131 CONG. REC. S7039 (1985); see also Russell, Trying to Stem the illegal
Tide, TIME, July 8, 1985, at 50.
171. S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 121(a)(1); 131 CONG. REc. S7041 (1985) (stating

that "[i]t is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee or
other consideration, for employment in the United States an alien, knowing the alien is an
unauthorized alien ...

with respect to such employment."). Id.

172.

467 U.S. at 893.

173.

See Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96

HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1336 (1983) (authored by the Harvard Law Review Ass'n) (discussing
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Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has itself held, the administration of the NLRA by the Board must be performed in accordance
with other federal policies and goals.17 4 Under this theory, IRCA
necessitates a Board finding that section 2(3) is inapplicable to illegal aliens. Consequently, since the INA, as currently amended, prohibits the employment relationship between an employer and an illegal alien, Congress has in effect overruled the Sure-Tan decision by
legislative decree.1 75 With the diminution of Sure-Tan's sway, states
should also discard the faulty reasoning employed in that case and
hold that illegal aliens are no longer entitled to workers' compensation benefits, as well as the other labor protections their statutes now
afford them.
V.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

The Equal Protection Clause and Illegal Aliens

The extension of statutory protection, and particularly that of
labor rights, to illegal aliens has been claimed on various constitutional grounds.1 76 Currently, the strongest argument put forth by
those who would extend such statutory protections to undocumented
177
aliens is the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Proponents of such an extension claim that the Equal Protection
Clause represents a constitutional guarantee, entitling illegal aliens
to a host of benefits afforded U.S. born workers under federal and
state legislation.17 8 These benefits include a multitude of social welthat the scarcity of jobs in their homelands makes the U.S. job market very attractive to illegal

aliens even though most illegal aliens are forced to accept low-status jobs with wages and
working conditions that are substandard to American workers).

174. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
175.

Id.; see also Casenotes, supra note 69, at 446 suggesting that:

Given the Sure-Tan Court's emphasis on deciding whether a NLRA/INA conflict
exists, and deferring to the INA when it perceived such a conflict, if the INA were
amended to outlaw the employment of illegal aliens, the Court might well rule that
the illegal alien employees should no longer be deemed employees within the
NLRA.
176. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to illegal aliens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (ap-

plying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' protection against deprivation of life, liberty or
property without due process of law to illegal aliens); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)

(applying the doctrine of preemption to state legislation affecting illegal aliens); U.S. v. Otherson, 637 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (extending 18 U.S.C. § 242 protection to illegal aliens,
protecting them from persons acting under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or

custom who deprives any inhabitant of any state, territory or district of his civil rights).
177. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202; Mathews, 426 U.S. at 67.
178. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202; Mathews, 426 U.S. at 67.
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fare payments,'179 including workers' compensation benefits.
Under the recent Supreme Court decision of Plyler v. Doe,1 80
however, the Equal Protection Clause, as applied to illegal aliens,
would not compel the states to grant workers' compensation benefits
to illegal aliens.' 8 ' Under the Equal Protection Clause, 82 a state,
through legislation, may treat different classes of persons in different
ways. 8" However, that classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' 84 The traditional approach by which the Court determines whether a classification violates the Equal Protection Clause is limited primarily to the
rather mechanical rational basis and strict scrutiny standards of review. 185 However, in recent years, and most noticeably in Plyler v.
Doe, 86 the soundness of this two-tier analysis has been questioned. 87
The Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe is an important
one for determining whether illegal aliens are entitled to all the
rights and privileges granted American born citizens, such as work179. See North, supra note 12 (discussing the extension of social welfare payments,
including workers' compensation benefits, to illegal aliens).
180. 457 U.S. at 202.
181. See 7 U.S.C. § 2105(0 (Supp. IV 1980) (denying food stamps to illegal aliens); 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B) (1976) (denying Supplementary Security Income benefits to aliens
unlawfully present in the United States); 42 U.S.C. § 1395(o)(2) (1976) (requiring continuous
U.S. residency for a five year period, prior to application for medicare benefits); 45 C.F.R. §
233.50 (1979) (excluding illegal aliens from Aid to Families with Dependent Children); 45
C.F.R. § 248.50 (1976) (excluding illegal aliens from Medicaid); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at
202 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection does not entitle
illegal aliens to the same benefits that legal residents enjoy); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 67 (upholding the conditioning of aliens' eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance
program on a continuous residence in the U.S. from attack on due process grounds); De
Canas, 424 U.S. at 351 (upholding a California labor statute, prohibiting the employment of
illegal aliens, from attack as being unconstitutional).
182. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that
"[n]o state ... shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law."
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
183. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
184. Id.
185. Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972); see also Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (affording suspect class status to classification based on
alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (affording suspect class status to classifications based on race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (affording suspect class
status to classifications based on national origin).
186. 457 U.S. at 202.
187. Note, Plyler v. Doe: Equal Protection For Illegal Aliens, 12 CAP. U.L. REv. 143
(1982) (authored by Nancy Manougian); see also Gunther, supra note 185.
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ers' compensation benefits, under the Equal Protection Clause. In
this case, a Texas statute was struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional because it violated the principles of the Equal Protection Clause. 88 The state statute treated illegal alien's children
differently from other children regarding their admission into public
schools. 189 The Texas law sought "to withhold from local school districts state funds for the education of children who were not 'legally
admitted' into the United States." 190 In invalidating the statute, the
Supreme Court's holding has had a significant impact on the constitutional rights of illegal aliens.191 First, the Court ruled that illegal
aliens could claim the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. 92 Second, the Court "departed from the
traditional level of scrutiny previously reserved for cldssifications
based on gender and illegitimacy, to invalidate the [Texas] statute."193 The Court, in so doing, now holds that illegal aliens are entitled to the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.19 4 However,
the Court's decision also makes it clear that such guarantees do not
mean that illegal aliens will be entitled to all of the same benefits
which citizens and legally admitted aliens rightfully claim. 95 "[T]he
Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights, rather [it]
simply measures the validity of classifications created by state
laws." 1 96
Thus, the holding in Plyler would permit the states to deny statutorily provided benefits, such as workers' compensation, to illegal
aliens. Although the Court in Plyler invalidated the Texas statute,
it did so because the statute imposed a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status.197
Thus the Court held that even the right to an education is not a
fundamental right which would require a strict scrutiny standard of
188. 457 U.S. at 210.
189.

Id. at 206.

190.

Id. at 205.

191.

Id. at 230.

192. See Note, supra note 187; see also 457 U.S. at 212 (stating that all persons within
the boundaries of a State are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protections).

193. See Note, supra note 187. This departure can be seen primarily in cases involving
classifications based on sex and illegitimacy. Id. It has been on an ad hoc basis and has not
been clearly articulated. Id.
194. 457 U.S. at 210.
195. Id.

196. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
197. 457 U.S. at 220.
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review under the Equal Protection Clause. 198 The decision in Plyler
should now be seen to constitutionally permit states to withhold social welfare benefits, including workers' compensation, from illegal
aliens based on their illegal presence in this country. 9
B. Federal Preemption
Another constitutional argument advanced in favor of entitling
illegal aliens to the rights and privileges of American born workers,
including workers' compensation, is that of federal preemption. 200
Under this theory of preemption, the Constitution, U.S. treaties, and
federal statutes comprise the "supreme [1]aw of the [1]and." 201
Through the preemption doctrine, courts reviewing the validity of a
particular state statute must distinguish among areas of exclusive
congressional authority; 2°2 areas inwhich state and federal power
may be exercised concurrently but where federal legislation either
expressly or impliedly preempts state enactments; 203 and areas where

further state legislation has been contemplated by Congress. 204
Where congressional intent is undermined by state legislation, in
those areas reserved for congressional action, the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution will preempt such state legislation.2 05
In the context of immigration law, state statutes that impede
198. Id. at 222.
199. See Note, supra note 187, at 154.
200. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.
2. This principle was affirmed early in the history of the
Supreme Court. In 1824, the Court stated "[t]he act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme,
and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield
to it." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824); see also MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 436 (1819) (holding that states may not "retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the general government.").
201. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.
2.
202. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951). The Court
in Spector held that Congress had exclusive power, over state legislation, to tax goods in interstate commerce. Id.
203. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
The Court held that states are precluded from acting where a "holding of federal exclusion of
state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility." Id. at 142-43.
204. Id. at 142. "The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or
the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field." Id.; see also Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (stating that, "[t]o hold that
a state statute identical in purpose with a federal statute is invalid under the Supremacy
Clause, we must be able to conclude that the purpose of the federal statute would to some
extent be frustrated by the state statute.").
205. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl.
2; see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at I; McCulloch, 17 U.S. at
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congressional authority to determine the categories of admissible
aliens have been consistently invalidated under the preemption doctrine.2°6 Early in the formulation of a national immigration policy it
was recognized that "[t]he [f]ederal [g]overnment has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the

United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization .... The states are granted no such power. ' 20 7 Thus, it is
a well-established principle that the power to regulate immigration
and enact such policy is an exclusively federal concern. 20 8 The states
are therefore denied the ability to interfere with such legislation and
may do nothing to impede Congressional designs.20 9
The federal government's INA sets forth this policy and preempts any state legislation that may run counter to this expression of
federal objectives. 210 Those who wish to extend statutory protection
to illegal aliens, thus claim that the INA precludes any state legislation affecting illegal immigrants. They claim that the states are preempted from denying illegal aliens any statutory benefits because
such action presumably falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
federal government.211
However, in recent years, the strict application of the preemption doctrine to legislation affecting illegal aliens has abated.212 The
206. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (stating that the "[p]ower to
regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 132 (stating that immigration is an area of exclusive federal
control); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (stating that the power to
exclude illegal aliens is a power reserved exclusively to Congress); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941) (stating that a state statute requiring state registration of aliens was invalid
because the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940 preempted the states from acting in this
regard); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (holding that state attempts to restrict aliens
were effectively excluding such aliens from employment, which is a power reserved exclusively
to Congress).
207. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419.
208. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354; FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S.
at 132; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 410; Hines, 312 U.S. at 52; Traux, 239 U.S. at 33.
209. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S.
at 132; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 410; Hines, 312 U.S. at 52; Traux, 239 U.S. at 33.
210. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142 (stating that
preemption of state statutes affecting illegal aliens is required because "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion" or because "Congress has unmistakably so
ordained" that result).
211. Id.; see also De Canas, 424 U.S. at 351; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 410; Hines, 312
U.S. at 52; Traux, 239 U.S. at 33.
212. See. e.g., De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356 (stating that the Court "cannot conclude that
preemption is required either because 'the nature of the ... subject matter permits not other
conclusion.' ").
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willingness of courts to allow state legislation affecting illegal aliens
has come about despite the fact that the "[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."2 ' This recent
trend is a direct result of the recognition that the influx of illegal
aliens into the United States places a serious burden on state economic resources which deprives lawful residents of those benefits to
which they are legally entitled. 14 Thus in De Canas v. Bica,215 the
Supreme Court refused to invalidate, as being preempted by the
INA, a California statute designed to correct the host of problems
resulting from illegal immigration. 16
In 1971, the California legislature enacted section 2805(a) of
the California Labor Code which makes it unlawful for an employer
to "knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence
in the United States. 21 7 The Court held that the statute was constitutional because it was in "harmonious accord" with federal immigration policy. I The Supreme Court held that the law was also
valid because "[s]tates possess broad authority under their police
powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers
within the [s]tate. ' '219 Section 2805(a) was thus upheld under the
theory that federal preemption should not invalidate state legislation
which is consistent with federal immigration policy and enacted
through a state's police powers.
De Canas v. Bica may therefore allow states to withhold from
illegal aliens benefits provided by their legislation without fear of
federal preemption. A state's decision to deny social welfare benefits,
such as workers' compensation, is the immediate result of the economic drain on state resources which deprive legal residents of benefits that they are entitled to under the U.S. Constitution, as well as
the constitutions of the various states. 220 The enactment of such statutes, denying illegal aliens the benefits afforded to American-born
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 354.
See Hearings, supra note 100.
424 U.S. at 351.

216. Id. at 355-56.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 352.
Id. at 356.
Id.

220. See SELECT COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (Comm. Print 1981); see also
Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 63 (1977); Note, Criminalizing Employment of Illegal Aliens: Work Authorization
Cards May Invade Privacy, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 637 (1981) (authored by Elizabeth Greene Nowakowsi).
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residents, would fall squarely within a state's police power."' Secondly, the promulgation of such statutes would be in accord with

federal immigration policy.222 The refusal to grant such benefits to
illegal aliens would make entry into this country far less attractive

22 3

and thus promote the INA's policy of halting illegal immigration. In
fact, denying workers' compensation benefits to illegal aliens would
not only be consistent with IRCA, it may be so required. IRCA now
prohibits the employment of illegal aliens. 224 To afford workers' compensation benefits to undocumented aliens for their employment-re-

lated injuries at a time when Congress has expressed a strong desire
to outlaw that employment relationship would "fly in the face of
what Congress has attempted to do."225
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Note has demonstrated that workers' compensation bene226
fits may be denied to illegal aliens for several important reasons.
Neither case law nor the U.S. Constitution compel a different result.
The Supreme Court's Sure-Tan decision, holding that illegal
aliens are "employees" within the meaning of section 2(3) of the
NLRA, should be viewed as invalid.2 27 The Court's opinion in SureTan suffers from serious defects in its reasoning, in that there is no
valid justification for the extension of labor protection to illegal
aliens.22 8 Another critical flaw with the Sure-Tan decision is that its
results run counter to both federal labor and immigration policies. 29
221. 424 U.S. at 356.
222. Id.
223. See HOUSE SELECT

COMM.ON POPULATION, 95th CONG., 2d SEss., LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 3, 16-17 (Comm. Print 1978); 125 CONG. REC.

13,286 (1978) (statement of Rep. Sawyer) (stating that employment in the United States is a
"magnet that attract aliens because job opportunities in this country are so much better than
in illegal aliens' homelands."); C. KEELY, U.S. IMMIGRATION: A POLICY ANALYSIS, at 53-62
(1979) (stating that illegal migration is "viewed as the result of economic and demographic
determinism-that is, a large labor pool in sending countries seeking better job opportunities,
coupled with the desire of U.S. employers for cheap labor.").
224. See IRCA, supra note 19.
225. Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (N.D.Ala. 1987).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 55-225 (analyzing in detail the faulty rationale
behind the Supreme Court's Sure-Tan decision, and the application of workers' compensation
benefits based on that holding).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 55-106 (analyzing in detail the defective reasoning in the Sure-Tan decision).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70 (explaining that the Supreme Court relied on a Board interpretation which lacks any justification for extending labor protection to
illegal aliens).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 81-106 (explaining in greater detail that the
Sure-Tan decision conflicts with both federal labor and immigration policies).
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Through the invalidation of Sure-Tan, the states would be allowed to deny illegal aliens social welfare benefits, such as workers'
compeasation. The fact that such statutes employ language very similar to section 2(3) in defining those "employees" covered by state
legislation has given Board interpretation of the section extensive influence. 230 With the rejection of Sure-Tan, illegal aliens would no
longer fall within the statutory definition of "employee" under the
NLRA and state labor statutes. As a result, undocumented aliens
would not be entitled to statutory labor protections, including workers' compensation.
Denying workers' compensation benefits to illegal aliens is consistent with federal immigration policy.2"1 The chief goal of U.S. immigration policy is to protect the employment opportunities available
to U.S. workers. 232 By refusing to grant illegal aliens such labor protection as workers' compensation benefits, their attraction to the
U.S. employment market would certainly decline. 33 As set out in
IRCA, illegal aliens are now prevented from lawful employment
within U.S. borders.23 4 By denying them workers' compensation protection, and thus making the U.S. labor market far less attractive,
states would be acting in accord with congressional objectives to protect the employment opportunities of U.S. workers. 3 5
Finally, the withdrawal of workers' compensation benefits from
illegal aliens would not violate the various constitutional propositions
advanced in favor of extending such statutory protection to illegal
aliens. 3 6 The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
should not be seen as requiring the states to afford illegal aliens all
the benefits that they grant legal residents. 37 As the recent case of
Plyler v. Doe has illustrated, the equal protection clause of the Four230.

See supra text accompanying notes 107-31 (analyzing in detail how the Sure-Tan

decision is influential in state decisions extending workers' compensation benefits to illegal

aliens).
231.

See supra text accompanying notes 130-32 (analyzing the fact that IRCA now

outlaws the employment relationship between an employer and an illegal alien, and thus
should require a withdrawal of labor protections from those unlawfully present in this
country).
232. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982) (stating that "a primary purpose in restricting
immigration is
233. See
234. See
235. See

to preserve jobs for American workers.").
Hearings, supra note t00.
IRCA, supra note 19.
supra text accompanying note 173.

236. See supra text accompanying notes 176-225 (analyzing in detail the application of

such constitutional guarantees as the Equal Protection Clause and the doctrine of federal preemption to legislation affecting illegal aliens).
237. See supra text accompanying note 176-99 (discussing in detail that the Equal Pro-

tection Clause would not guarantee workers' compensation benefits to illegal aliens).
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teenth Amendment does not afford illegal aliens suspect classification or a strict scrutiny standard of review in determining the constitutionality of their disparate treatment at the state level.238 Nor does
the doctrine of federal preemption necessitate that such benefits as
workers' compensation be granted to illegal aliens.239 State statutes
dealing with illegal aliens are no longer viewed as automatically preempted by the INA. 240 This is especially true where the state's regulation of illegal aliens falls within its police powers. 41 Statutes denying these benefits to illegal aliens would be in keeping with the
states' police powers and in accord with federal immigration
242
policy.
The IRCA, the recently enacted amendment to the INA, prohibits the employment of illegal aliens.243 It is a revolutionary and
dramatic reaction by Congress in response to the calls to halt the
rapidly increasing influx of illegal immigration into this nation. Its
objective is to keep open the employment opportunities available to
American citizens. As a result, workers' compensation benefits
should be denied to illegal aliens. However, the states have relied on
the Supreme Court decision in Sure-Tan to extend these labor benefits to illegal aliens.2 44 The lack of any meaningful rationale behind
that decision, and the fact that the results of Sure-Tan run counter
to U.S. labor and immigration policies, require a different conclusion. Such a conclusion would mandate a Board finding that illegal
aliens are not "employees" within the meaning of section 2(3) of the
NLRA. An interpretation of the NLRA as being exclusive of illegal
aliens would strengthen the argument in favor of denying illegal
aliens workers' compensation benefits. Finally, not only does federal
immigration policy suggest that illegal aliens should be denied workers' compensation benefits, but enactment of IRCA may now require
such action. Such state legislation, withdrawing the protection of
238. Id.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 200-25 (discussing in detail the application of
the doctrine of federal preemption to illegal aliens' entitlements to workers' compensation).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See IRCA, supra note 19.
244. See, e.g., Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candelo, 478 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that illegal aliens are entitled to workers' compensation benefits under state
law); Gene's Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
there is no evidence of any intent to exclude illegal aliens from the protections of the state's
workmens' compensation statute).
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workers' compenstation benefits to those persons unlawfully present
in this country, would stand up to a constitutional attack. 45
Mark Anthony Miele

245. See supra text accompanying notes 176-225 (analyzing in detail that the withdrawal of workers' compensation benefits from illegal aliens would stand up in face of the
constitutional propositions advanced in favor of extending such benefits to those unlawfully
present in the U.S.).
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